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ABSTRACT
Digitalization and servitization are impacting many domains, in-
cluding the mining industry. As the equipment becomes connected
and technical infrastructure evolves, business models and risk man-
agement need to adapt. In this paper, we present a study on how
changes in asset and risk distribution are evolving for the actors in
a software ecosystem (SECO) and system-of-systems (SoS) around
a mining operation. We have performed a survey to understand
how Service Level Agreements (SLAs) – a common mechanism for
managing risk – are used in other domains. Furthermore, we have
performed a focus group study with companies. There is an overall
trend in the mining industry to move the investment cost (CAPEX)
from the mining operator to the vendors. Hence, the mining opera-
tor instead leases the equipment (as operational expense, OPEX)
or even acquires a service. This change in business model impacts
operation, as knowledge is moved from the mining operator to the
suppliers. Furthermore, as the infrastructure becomes more com-
plex, this implies that the mining operator is more and more reliant
on the suppliers for the operation and maintenance. As this change
is still in an early stage, there is no formalized risk management,
e.g. through SLAs, in place. Rather, at present, the companies in
the ecosystem rely more on trust and the incentives created by
the promise of mutual future benefits of innovation activities. We
believe there is a need to better understand how to manage risk
in SECO as it is established and evolves. At the same time, in a
SECO, the focus is on cooperation and innovation, the companies
do not have incentives to address this unless there is an incident.
Therefore, industry need, we believe, help in systematically under-
standing risk and defining quality aspects such as reliability and
performance in the new business environment.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social and professional topics→Automation; • Software and
its engineering→ Risk management.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In modern software development and IT operations, cooperation
and business partnerships are becoming more and more open –
through open source software, open innovation and open data. In
the PIMM DMA project1 – a “digital mining arena” – new business
models and ways of cooperating are explored, including how to
“specify service level agreements. . . in new value networks” – essen-
tially handling risk. In the new service economy, with an increas-
ing number of open collaborations, innovation and new business
models become more important [5] – essentially asset distribution.
However, it is also important for businesses to have predictability
in costs and risk – hence, there is still a need for agreements, formal
or informal. In practice, there is usually a hybrid of open collabora-
tions (sometimes referred to as software ecosystems (SECO) [2, 16])
and traditional ones regulated in contracts and agreements.
PIMM DMA (Pilot for Industrial Mobile communication in Min-
ing, Digitalised Mining Arena) aims to foster innovative ideas and
to increase the maturity level where industrialization can start and
business relations can be initiated. Furthermore, PIMM DMA aims
to build an understanding of how to specify services level agree-
ments between involved suppliers and users, in new value networks.
Innovation is focused to the following areas:
• Innovation in service operations for industrial mobile net-
works
• Innovation in cellular communication technology
• Innovation in industrial products and services enabled by
cellular communication
• Innovation in industrial automation focusing mining appli-
cations
• Innovation in systems-of-systems
Examples of software-intensive services tested in the project
include:
• Connected Mining Operators
• Remote controlled wheel loader in production
1www.sics.se/projects/pimm
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• Connected Drill rigs
• Service Level Agreements
• AI and ML for realtime QoS prediction
• Process for building mobile networks in daily operations
The prototype implementations are tried out in an operational
mine.
In our previous work, we studied how technical infrastructure
and business relationships are affected by System-of-Systems sce-
narios [3]. The characteristics of how companies cooperate in
the PIMM ecosystem influence risk management and innovation.
For example, in traditional bilateral business relationships, risk
is known and regulated in contracts. However, in the traditional
buyer-supplier relationship, innovation might be weaker [3]. On
the other hand, if the companies collaborate in a SECO style with
less regulated relationships, the dependency – and thereby the risk
– can be more difficult to manage. A SECO, however, is one way to
promote open innovation [5]
In this study, we focus on the distribution of risk and assets
within a SECO. Companies manage risk, e.g., by agreeing on Service
Level Agreements (SLAs), by insurances, or by moving asset risk
to partners. Assets can either be acquired – resulting in a capital
expenditure – or rented – resulting in operational expenditure.
Even though the latter means the company does not own the asset,
the risk related to the asset is transferred to someone else.
In a first step, we survey the prevalence of SLAs among – and
within – companies. In a second step, we explore risk and asset
distribution within the PIMM DMA ecosystem. More specifically,
three research questions are investigated:
RQ1 What are the characteristics of risk management and SLAs
in a software ecosystem in general and specifically in the
PIMM DMA ecosystem?
RQ2 How are risks and assets distributed among the actors in the
PIMM DMA ecosystem?
RQ3 Which are the bridges and barriers when digitalizing a min-
ing operation?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets our
work in context by discussing some related work. Section 3 explains
the research method, including a description of the respondents
and PIMM DMA ecosystem. The main results are then presented
in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Much of the current SLA research is technology-focused. For in-
stance, many contributions aim to enable or improve automatic
SLA negotiation between “intelligent” autonomous agents on inter-
active market places [23, 26]. Another strand of research addresses
how service providers can maximize profits within the constraints
imposed by the service levels [1, 4, 11]. A good survey of SLA man-
agement focusing on these and other technical aspects is provided
by Faniyi and Bahsoon [7].
While these aspects are certainly relevant also in the kind of
ecosystems that we address, our research has a different focus
that also acknowledges informal negotiations and human decision-
making as important aspects of SLAs. These aspects can be seen as
setting the scene for the more technical ones – before autonomous
agents start to negotiate terms with each other, business decisions
about selling, or procuring services in the first place must be taken.
At the same time, it is known that the informal and human aspects
pose problems, e.g., that IT departments fail to express availabil-
ity service levels in ways that are understandable to the business
side [19], that value-maximizing SLA decisions are difficult even to
professionals [10], and that the information expressed in SLAs can
lead to sub-optimal decisions [13].
Furthermore, recommendations on what to include in SLAs are
not always consistent. For example, in principle it is known that it
is prudent to express availability service levels both in terms of (i)
total unplanned downtime allowed either as a percentage (e.g. 99.98
%) or a number of hours (e.g. 10 h) , (ii) the maximum number of
unplanned outages allowed and (iii) the maximum duration of any
single unplanned outage allowed [9]. However, recommendations
vary. Renowned consultancy Gartner sometimes emphasizes posing
requirements on maximum outage duration [14] but sometimes
uses only a percentage [18] when recommending how towrite SLAs.
ITIL has an SLA template with both a percentage and a maximum
number of unplanned outages, but without a maximum outage
duration [24]. As shown in our SLA survey (Section 3.1), similar
variability is observed in practice.
SECOs changing how the software business is conducted [16].
In SECOs, the boundaries between supplier and customer are less
clear, and companies that used to be competitors might choose to
cooperate for mutual benefits [2, 12]. SECOs is one way to promote
open innovation [5]. Typical examples are Google Android, Apache
and Eclipse Foundation, which have established a novel approach
to software engineering. The SECO approach refers to the collabo-
ration of software activities across organizational boundaries, e.g.
through (a) common software technology, appearing either as a
platform, standard, or solution, (b) business, as a set of needs, pos-
sibly beyond profit and revenue, and (c) connecting relationships,
as a community of actors [15]. In a SECO, where relationships are
not (solely) pecuniary, handling expectations such as on service
levels changes compared to a more traditional B2B relationship. The
cooperation are not necessarily pecuniary and powers of influence
change. They can be both coercive e.g. how Google is controlling
the API levels for approved Android phones or non-coercive such
as expert or referent power [25].
To summarize the related work, the predominant model of study-
ing SLAs has been the technical point of view. Though it has been
pointed out in the literature that SLAs should be described as a mix-
ture of human-mediated functionality and computer-interpretable
factors [17], studies of SLAs from the non-technical perspective
are scarce. Thus our work contributes to this important but under-
investigated field, with a particular focus on human decision-making
and business aspects of SLAs in an open innovation environment.
3 RESEARCH METHOD
Weperformed both a survey and a case study to address the research
questions. In the first step, we surveyed enterprises in Sweden
to understand the management of risk using SLAs, see Fig. 1. In
the second step, we performed a case study in the PIMM DMA
ecosystem to explore the risk and asset distribution among the
companies.
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Figure 1: Overview of our research process.
3.1 SLA Survey
In a first exploratory survey, we investigated how SLA practices
differ depending on whether the SLAs govern IT services procured
internally (e.g. from an IT department) or externally (e.g. from an
IT consultancy). Such differences are interesting from the point of
view of SECOs, as relations in ecosystems in a sense can be seen as
an intermediate form, sharing some characteristics with internally
procured IT services and some with externally procured ones [16].
These differences were explored with a questionnaire (see Ap-
pendix A) asking the respondents first whether SLAs are at all used
to govern the quality of IT services bought within the enterprise
or from outside of the enterprise, respectively. If SLAs are used,
the respondents were also asked whether they typically contain
(i) maximum unplanned downtime allowed, (ii) maximum num-
ber of unplanned outages allowed, (iii) maximum duration of an
unplanned outage allowed, and (iv) fines upon violation.
We are not aiming to characterize any particular population
as a whole. Rather, we want to explore and understand of SLAs.
Therefore, purposive sampling [20] was employed to cover respon-
dents representing sectors in society deemed particularly important
by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency2. The answers were
collected anonymously.
The survey answers are mainly analyzed by descriptive statistics.
The survey was executed in February and March 2017. Respon-
dents from four sectors participated: financial services (N = 2)
transport companies (N = 11), food companies (N = 9), and gov-
ernment organizations (N = 19), i.e. 41 answers in total, depicted
in Table 1. (2 enterprises provided spuriously low revenue figures
in the survey, so they are excluded from the analysis, and their
revenues are listed as unknown in the summary in Table 1 and are
left blank in Table 3.)
2www.msb.se
3The organizations with unknown revenue size are not included in the analysis.
Table 1: Participating enterprises in the survey, per domain
and revenue size (Large > 1000 MSEK, Medium = 100 MSEK-
1000 MSEK, Small < 100MSEK).
Domain Large Medium Small Unknown3 All
Financial service 1 1 2
Food 3 5 1 9
Government 9 8 1 1 19
Transportation 3 7 1 11
Total 13 17 9 2 41
3.2 PIMM DMA Case study
The second part is an embedded case study [21] of the PIMM DMA
ecosystem. With the case study, we wanted to get a deeper insight
into the SECO and the reasoning of the companies. The case study
is executed as a focus group study. We carried out semi-structured
focus groups [20] with the five companies from the PIMM DMA
ecosystem. We performed focus groups with 1 to 4 respondents
from each company. The focus groups were semi-structured in the
sense that data was collected using a number of predefined but
open questions [22], see Appendix B.
All meetings were conducted as physical meetings with two
researchers present – one primarily taking notes and one primarily
moderating the focus group session.
All focus groups started with broad opening questions about
current and future SLAs. Depending on the answers, we followed
up with more questions from the list. The participants were en-
couraged to draw system descriptions on a whiteboard or similar
to convey their answers and get a common understanding of the
PIMM DMA ecosystem. The sessions ended with a wrap-up where
we summarized the main findings and gave the opportunity to
correct or add things.
After each focus group, of author wrote a summary, based on
notes andmemory, within one day. The other one then reviewed the
summary and complemented the text. These notes, typically 1–2
Pre
-pr
int
ESEC/FSE ’19, August 26–30, 2019, Tallinn, Estonia Thomas Olsson and Ulrik Franke
Table 2: Prevalence of internal and external SLAs, per size
and domain. (The complete data is available in Table 3.)
External SLAs Internal SLAs
Size Domain Yes No Yes No
Large Financial 1 1
Food 2 1 3
Government 9 5 4
Medium Financial 1 1
Food 3 2 3 2
Government 8 4 4
Transportation 1 2 3
Small Food 1 1
Government 1 1
Transportation 1 6 1 6
Total 27 12 20 19
regular pages of written text, were sent to the respondents. They
were asked to review the notes and correct any misunderstandings.
Once the notes had been reviewed, they were coded. The 25
questions in the interview guide were used as input to create 33
codes. After initial coding by one researcher, the other researcher
reviewed the result and codes were discussed until agreement was
reached. Once all interview notes had been coded, selective coding
was performed to identify the core codes and categories. Finally,
core codes and categories were summarized to identify the main
findings.
After analysis, representatives from all participating companies
as well as other partners from the PIMM DMA project attended a
seminar where the findings were presented. Everyone was given
the opportunity to comment and correct on the findings as detailed
in the presentation – both those who were part of the focus groups
as well as the others in the project.
The partners in the project are suppliers of products and services
to a closed pit mine as well as the mining operator. The interviews
were conducted during the winter of 2018/2019. The individual
answers are confidential. Hence, in the text below, the companies
are referred to by a randomized number.
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.1 Survey
The results from the SLA survey indicate that SLAs are more preva-
lent when contracting external organizations (27 out of 39 respon-
dents) compared to when cooperating across different parts of one
company (21 out of 39), see Table 2. Furthermore, larger organiza-
tions (as measured by revenue) are more prone to use SLAs than
small organizations. Out of 10 enterprises with a revenue of less
than 100 MSEK (small enterprises), just a single one uses SLAs
internally and 2 use SLAs externally. As a contrast, out of the 13
enterprises with a revenue of more than 1000 MSEK (large), 8 use
SLAs internally and 12 use SLAs externally. Of the medium-sized
enterprises in our study, 13 of out 17 use SLAs externally and 11
out of 17 use SLAs internally.
Finally, fines as a consequence for not fulfilling SLAs are quite
common with external service providers (fines are used by 17 out of
the 28 organizations using SLAs externally) but very rare with inter-
nal providers (fines are used only by 3 out of the 21 organizations
using SLAs internally), see Table 3.
4.2 Focus Groups
As seen in the previous section, external SLAs are common for
large organizations but not necessarily smaller ones. Furthermore,
internal SLAs are common though not to the same extent as exter-
nal SLAs. We executed the focus groups to understand how this
interplay works in a SECO mining context with different actors.
The rest of the section summarizes the six major observations we
made.
4.2.1 Transition to As-a-service Business Models. The suppliers
have different experience with selling machinery or services today.
Supplier C focuses on selling systems and hardware, as does sup-
plier A, though Supplier A is experimenting with selling operating-
hours instead. Supplier B has a more diverse and customizable offer,
where they sometimes sell hardware, sometimes use leasing agree-
ments, and sometimes sell services such as operating-hours. Today,
the mining operator mostly uses SLAs for ICT (Information and
Communication Technologies) services, not operational technology
used in the actual mining.
Looking into the future, however, there is a clear overall trend
that customers want to move from investments in equipment –
CAPEX – to leasing or signing as-a-service agreements – OPEX.
This means that the cash flow changes as the suppliers take more of
the upfront cost in exchange for receiving recurring payments for
usage. On the other hand, the suppliers also take a bigger responsi-
bility in the value-chain, where they are not only selling hardware
but can also charge for maintenance and other services.
However, some suppliers are more skeptical as to whether it is
possible to sign long enough contracts for the suppliers to be able
to take the upfront cost; essentially, they are not sure that they
want to assume that financial risk. Other suppliers manage such
risks by clauses requiring the customer to buy a minimum number
of operation-hours.
On the customer side, a transition into the as-a-service paradigm
also gives rise to new issues. For example, the mining operator
wants to be able to audit and approve new software that is added
even to machinery that it does not own. In case of new functionality,
there is a willingness to pay for such updates, whereas corrective
maintenance updates are expected to be includedwithout additional
cost until end-of-life.
4.2.2 Economies of Scale. Suppliers have equipment in several
different mines, sometimes across the world. Having personnel to
maintain the equipment and ensuring operation thus requires a
local presence. Different suppliers have different approaches to this.
Suppliers A and C work in line with what would be expected
from the economies of scale point of view; focusing on standard
products that are only somewhat customized to individual cus-
tomers. Supplier C has remote monitoring and operation as part
of their roadmap to be able to have a virtual presence in the mines
without having to bear the full cost of personnel physically present.
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Supplier A is working extensively through local dealers and stan-
dard contracts and service levels, thus avoiding the need to have
personnel of their own everywhere.
Supplier B, however, has chosen a different strategy, one that
appears counter-intuitive from the economies of scale point of view:
maintaining a strong local presence and extensively customizing
the equipment to individual customers. Thus, development is more
influenced by individual needs from the mines and less focused on
off-the-shelf products. Still, supplier B has managed to maintain
good profit margins with this strategy.
4.2.3 Asymmetric Actors. In a mine, there is a limited number
of vehicles and devices. Even though a mining operator typically
owns several mines, most of their suppliers operate on a global
market. Hence, the suppliers have equipment in many mines owned
by different companies. Furthermore, there are several different
suppliers of equipment in a mine, even for similar or the same type
of equipment. Some suppliers are very specialized, focusing on one
part of the value chain whereas others cover larger parts of the
value-chain for the kind of equipment they make.
Supplier B supplies equipment but is sometimes forced to take a
systems integration responsibility even though they would prefer
not to, e.g., for connectivity or integration with other systems. One
reason is that they are physically present in the mines whereas
providers of, e.g., connectivity, are not.
Supplier C, however, provides more end-to-end integration of
their equipment. Especially when it comes to data from the op-
eration, they are skeptical to share and to use data from other
organizations. Normally, the “data integration” is done in the con-
trol room by the personnel there. If the control room is no longer
in the loop, not only will supplier C’s position in the value chain
be weaker, but the dynamic of decisions in the mine would change.
The mining operator, on the other hand, prefers to have a single
point of contact if something is not working; they do not want to
be the system integrator. However, they also realize that for, e.g.,
connectivity, the providers of both hardware and service are not
present in the mine. Hence, they foresee that they will need to
have employees or contractors locally to manage these services,
as is already the case with some systems. This is especially true
since the mine is a changing physical environment that is less static,
compared to communication networks in other places.
Suppliers A and B both try to keep up to date on ongoing techni-
cal standardization efforts, and to some extent also influence them.
This can be seen as a way to secure and “future-proof” their roles
in emerging ecosystems.
4.2.4 Partitioning of Risk. The transition to as-a-service business
models introducesmore dependencies among the suppliers – drilling-
meters sold may depend on connectivity provided by another ser-
vice provider. This translates into changes in the dynamics of main-
tenance and distribution of risk among the parties. Diagnostics will
be different, requiring new competences and possibly new agree-
ments to be able to live up to expected service levels. Consider,
for example, a remote-controlled vehicle that requires connectiv-
ity. However, if the remote-controlled vehicle is not responding to
commands, the root-cause can be found in several systems, not all
of which are controlled by the vehicle supplier.
For a supplier selling vehicle-hours as-a-service, a service level
can only be guaranteed if it is clear who is responsible for connec-
tivity, and on what conditions. Otherwise it is difficult to accept a
contract where vehicle-hours are guaranteed on pain of monetary
penalties to be paid. A possible alternative, raised by one supplier,
is to find a way to make an SLA contingent on, e.g., connectivity,
i.e., contingent on the other actors delivering as they should.
In general, as as-a-service business models become more com-
monplace, dependencies, roles, and partitioning of risks among the
parties will need to be formalized in SLAs or similar contracts. The
exact extent of this need, however, will depend on the architecture,
and where integration take place. We expect that with the OPEX-
and service-oriented paradigm, SLAs will become more important
and the various ecosystem roles will become clearer. Depending on
their risk appetites and business models, some actors might take on
the role of an orchestrator or systems integrator, while others will
want to avoid dependencies on others. In particular, the partitioning
of risk across the actors will be a central concern.
4.2.5 Risks and Unintended Consequence of new Business Models.
Related to risk, supplier A makes the distinction between known
risks that can be mitigated, e.g., through prudent SLAs or business
models, and the unknown risks that can be introduced by new tech-
nology and new business models. For example, remote-controlled
vehicles introduce the risk of outages in connectivity, which can
to some extent be mitigated through SLAs. However, they might
also introduce more subtle behavior changes that are more difficult
to plan for. For instance, as the driver of a remote-controlled vehi-
cle is not in the vehicle, a crash or uncomfortable handling does
not affect the driver in the same way. This might lead to different
maintenance needs, as the equipment is worn differently.
However, knowledge of these risks may be unevenly distributed
among the parties. For example, supplier B is able to analyze health
data from some 2 000 machines globally, which none of their indi-
vidual customers can do. Such knowledge may enable new roles,
e.g., the ability to accept – for a fee – risks that are quantifiable and
manageable to some, but not to all actors.
4.2.6 Sharing and Using Data. All suppliers to the mine ecosystem
agree that the operational data is owned by the mining operator.
However, the mining operator does share this operational data with
the suppliers. The security of any cloud solutions where such data
is stored is paramount. Data is important to everyone to optimize
their business. For example, data is used for preventive mainte-
nance and to tune and optimize algorithms. There are no current
business models based on data, however. The data integrity and con-
fidentiality are handled on a contractual basis and not detailed in
SLAs. However, in a future with more exchange of data, additional
contracts including SLA appendices may be necessary.
Supplier C, however, focuses a lot on the quality of the data. For
data to be used in operations they have to be able to trust it. Hence,
they want to be able to control the entire process from collection,
over transmission to processing of the data, and not allow it to flow
through others’ systems.
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5 DISCUSSION AND THREATS TO VALIDITY
5.1 RQ1 What are the characteristics of risk
management and SLAs in a software
ecosystem in general and specifically in the
PIMM DMA ecosystem?
Formal agreements on service levels are less common than we
thought. In the survey, the large organizations use SLAs. Govern-
ment organizations in particular, independent of size, have SLAs.
We speculate that one possible explanation for government orga-
nizations using SLAs is that they, more than other organizations,
make larger procurements including maintenance and operation.
In the PIMM DMA case study, SLAs are uncommon. When we
asked about this in the interviews, the answers were either that
there is a kind of standard agreement or that there is a de facto
service level which the organizations informally agree to.
Ronald Coase famously asked why there are firms at all [6]. Why
is not everything bought on the market, using the price mecha-
nism? His answer, in short, is that firms are established to avoid the
transaction costs involved in buying things on the market rather
than making them in-house. Among these are “costs of negotiating
and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction
which takes place on a market”. We believe that more intertwined
ecosystems possibly represent an intermediate form, not in-house
but also not completely on the market.
Inspired by Coase, we thus hypothesize that in ecosystems that
are relatively small and relatively durable, there is less need to reg-
ulate service levels formally in contracts. There is sufficient trust
and alignment that the transaction costs of formally negotiating a
contract can be saved. The PIMM DMA case is an example of this.
However, in larger and more fluid ecosystems, there is a greater
need to regulate service levels formally in contracts. As relation-
ships become more global and interaction and inter-dependencies
among the organizations in the ecosystem increase in complexity,
service levels will need to be managed more formally than today.
The comments from the PIMM DMA organizations interviewed
about future developments point in this direction.
5.2 RQ2 How are risks and assets distributed
among the actors in the PIMM DMA
ecosystem?
As the domain is moving from a focus on CAPEX investments and
owning the equipment to OPEX and instead leasing equipment or
buying as-a-service, assets and risks move between organizations.
Basically, the CAPEX investment is moved to the suppliers, which
in turn are charging the mining operator for leasing or for a service,
i.e., through OPEX.
In a sense, the capital risk, i.e., the risk of investing money up-
front in development and construction that might not pay off in
the end is thus moved from the mining operator to the suppliers.
This implies, we believe, that the suppliers will take a greater re-
sponsibility for both the roadmap and innovation of new products
and services as well as for the maintenance and continued opera-
tion. This, in turn, means that some knowledge is, ideally, moved
away from the mining operator to the suppliers, or, worse, is lost
on the way. In addition, we hypothesize that the position of the
suppliers in the business relationship with the mining operator is
strengthened.
Technical risk, on the other hand, we believe is moved from the
suppliers to the mining operator. As knowledge and operation is in-
creasingly moved from the mining operator to the suppliers and the
suppliers are dependent on each other and likely on sub-suppliers
as well, overseeing and understanding the actual risk to the opera-
tion becomes more difficult. A failure in one service might halt the
operation. If the relevant supplier cannot fix this failure quickly,
the outage might be prolonged. Furthermore, maintenance is the
responsibility of the suppliers, which means the mining operator
are in the hand of the suppliers. As the operation becomes more and
more dependent on services and on leased equipment, we believe
that the technical risk to the operation becomes more complex to
manage.
There is an ecosystem around the mining operation. The mining
operator is the orchestrator and the different suppliers have differ-
ent roles in the ecosystem. However, the different suppliers have
their own ecosystems as well. Those consist of various components
– local or remote (in the “cloud”) – with additinal suppliers and sub-
contractors as well. These supplier ecosystems are orchestrated by
them, and each of the different mines where the suppliers provide
services can be seen as single actors in these supplier ecosystems.
Hence, in essence, there are ecosystems of ecosystems: Mining op-
erators orchestrate vertical integration of different services in their
own mines, while their service providers orchestrate horizontal
integration of their services, including product development and
maintenance, across all the different mines where they operate.
We believe this even further complicates the direct and indirect
business relationships and how risk and assets are distributed.
We hypothesize that as operations become more intertwined
among ecosystems of ecosystems, there is an increasing need for
risk management and risk awareness. Hence, we believe SLAs in
these situations are relevant future work where software engineer-
ing and business research will need to meet. Furthermore, under-
standing of risk management on a higher level will also be needed.
Sometimes, we believe, it is possible to estimate risks and conse-
quences upfront, but not always. We believe that there is a need
for further research in identifying the situations where the risk can
be analyzed and when not. This implies that there is also a need
to manage unknown risks, e.g. through cyberinsurances or other
novel mechanisms in the ever more digitalized and software-intense
mining industry.
5.3 RQ3 Which are the bridges and barriers
when digitalizing a mining operations?
We did not include detailed questions on data and data sharing in
the interview guideline. However, the topic came up in all the focus
groups anyway. Interestingly, there is a large consensus that the
mining operator owns the data and that the data is sensitive from a
business perspective. Still, the mining operator quite freely shares
the data with the suppliers – under non-disclosure agreements.
Hence, the synergy is clear to all parties. We believe data is one
bridge for further developing the digital ecosystem. It is also clear
from the focus groups that the organizations all believe they are
not yet using the data to its full potential.
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However, for data from other parties to be usable, data integrity
and trustworthiness are paramount. Hence, there is a barrier today
in that credible mechanisms for data validation are missing. This,
we hypothesize, is both a technical barrier and a trust issue in the
business relationships.
The transformation from amore traditional and CAPEX-oriented
mining operation to a more digitalized and OPEX-oriented one is
still early in its lifecycle. In fact, when we presented our findings
to the project, they pointed out that the current technical infras-
tructure is still immature and evolving. Hence, the possible service
level is difficult to estimate. Hence, in this environment, SLAs and
formal agreements are difficult. Instead, the organizations accept
the increased risk as this is still new and innovation focused. How-
ever, we believe at some point, when the operation has become
sufficiently dependent on the service level on offer, SLAs will need
to become more prevalent. At this point, we believe it will also
be possible to pay more to get a better service level – as the sup-
pliers are competing and see that supplying a better service level
is something they can charge for. However, we speculate that as
the ecosystem matures and reaches the point where a high service
level is no longer a competitive edge but a basic requirement, SLAs
might again decline. This is the case, for example, for mobile tele-
phony, where today we expect it to just work whereas a decade ago
we might have been willing to pay extra for more bandwidth and
shorter latency.
5.4 Threats to Validity
Here the validity of the conducted research is discussed based on
commonly considered validity threats, e.g., as listed in [20, 21].
Construct validity concern the degree to which the constructs
investigated are actually measured by the questions. For the survey
part, construct validity is important to consider. The questions were
iterated several times and tested internally with colleagues before
sent to the respondents. Furthermore, we use standard terminology.
Lastly, the research questions and overall scope was iterated several
times among the authors as well as relevant stakeholders to assure
our aim was right. In summary, we believe the threats to construct
validity should be low. For the interview part, we performed a
qualitative study with mostly open questions. Hence, construct
validity is not a serious threat to the validity of the interview part.
Reliability concerns the degree to which a respondent would
give the same answers if they answered the same questions again
under the same conditions. For the survey part, we used multiple
choice questions and mostly asked questions which are objective
and not personal opinion. Hence, threats to the reliability should
be low. For the interview part, however, we used open questions
and solicited qualitative answers. These type of answers are more
personal opinion, depend more on the personal experience, what
had happened the hours and days before the interviews (what is
on the respondents’ mind), etc. Hence, the threats to reliability for
the interview part should be taken seriously. In essence, we do not
believe the answers are, per se, wrong but might be incomplete.
Internal validity is related to the causality of the study. However,
we are not studying relationships among factors to draw casual con-
clusions. Rather, we are exploring the phenomena of SLAs. Hence,
threat to internal validity are not a big concern, neither for the
interview part nor the survey part.
Regarding external validity (generalizability), we have not per-
formed a statistically rigorous sampling approach (cf. Section 3).
However, our aim is to understand the diversity and major trends,
not make claims about the sampled population. Thus, as pointed
out by Flyvbjerg [8], the threats to generalization should not be
exaggerated. As we have covered different sizes, several domains,
both technical and non-technical ones, and many locations in Swe-
den, we believe the findings to be, at least to some extent, relevant
for software-intense companies in Sweden.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
More and more of the equipment in a mine is connected. The result
is an interconnected system-of-systems of physical equipment as
well as cloud components – from multiple suppliers. This impacts
not only the technical infrastructure but also business models and
risk management.
The business model is moving from upfront CAPEX investments
to servitization and OPEX cost instead. Hence, the mining operator
is less and less owning equipment and relying more on the suppliers
for operation and maintenance. The suppliers will take a larger
responsibility for research and innovation, where previously the
mining operator to a larger extent dictated what the suppliers
should provide.
As the mining operator is more reliant on suppliers for the op-
eration, this impacts how risk is managed. Furthermore, as the
technical infrastructure becomes more complex and the knowl-
edge for how to maintain and handle problems is more specialized,
the mining operator is increasingly dependent on the suppliers
to ensure continued operation. SLAs is one way of managing risk
through contractual agreements. Overall, SLAs are common – at
least for large companies – in other domains. However, in the PIMM
DMA context, this is not (yet) a practice. As the digilitzation of the
mining operation is still in an early phase, it is difficult for the
suppliers to commit to a certain level and for the mining operator
to know which SLAs that are needed in the new system-of-systems.
Hence, it seems, in order not to slow down innovation and intro-
duction of new ways of working, the actors in the ecosystem rely
on trust and mutual benefit.
We see two main conclusions from our case study. On the one
hand, SLAs are about managing risks and we believe that there
is a need to better understand what the new technologies and
business models implies for risk management. On the other hand,
we speculate that in the companies studied in our case study, as
long as there are no major incidents, there will be no incentives to
improve the risk management in general and the SLA practices in
particular. However, should there be an incident, then there will
be a “blame game” and scramble to formalize risk distrbution in
the ecosystem. If the PIMM DMA case is not unique, then the same
implication is likely also valid for other ecosystems.
The PIMM DMA project is one example of the ongoing digitiliza-
tion and servitization which happens everywhere in society today.
However, with risk and assets being distributed differently, we be-
lieve there is a need to understand the impact for the companies to
ensure successful companies. Specifically, for complex ecosystems
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and systems-of-systems there is a need to better understand how to
negotiate and agree to distribute risk. Furthermore, quality aspects
such as reliability and performance will also be more difficult to
assess. This, we believe, also requires more research to understand
how such aspects can be evaluated upfront, during operation, and
in the evolution of the system-of-systems. A critical aspect is to
address the challenges and issues in industry and perform applied
research and technology transfer.
A QUESTIONS IN THE SURVEY ON SLAS
1. Type of enterprise (Private, government agency, county, mu-
nicipality)
2. Societal sector (Energy, financial, trade and industry, health
and medical, information and communication, municipal
technical services, food, public administration, protection
and safety, social security, transport)
3. Enterprise size (Numberof employees, revenue)
4. Enterprise IT dependence (scale 1-10)
5. Do you use SLAs to govern the quality of IT services bought
within the enterprise, e.g. from an IT department? If yes,
then please specify:
5.1. Maximum unplanned downtime allowed
5.2. Maximum number of unplanned outages allowed
5.3. Maximum duration of an unplanned outage allowed
5.4. Fines upon violation
6. Do you use SLAs to govern the quality of IT services bought
from outside of the enterprise, e.g. from an IT consultancy?
If yes, then please specify:
6.1. Maximum unplanned downtime allowed
6.2. Maximum number of unplanned outages allowed
6.3. Maximum duration of an unplanned outage allowed
6.4. Fines upon violation
B INTERVIEW GUIDE
1. Systems-of-Systems
1.1. Why is it created?
1.2. Why a SoS?
1.3. Whose system is it?
1.4. Who owns it?
1.5. Who are the stakeholders?
1.6. What should it do?
1.7. How much should it perform?
1.8. How should it be organized?
1.9. When does it change?
2. Software ecosystem
2.1. Governance (ad-hoc, democratic, autocratic)
2.2. Role (orchestrator, niche, add-on)
3. Service Level Agreements
3.1. SLAs today
3.2. SLAs missing
3.3. Formality of SLAs
3.4. Consequence if not fulfilling SLAs
3.5. Frequency
3.6. Rationale
3.7. Origin
3.8. Possibility to charge extra to get an SLA
3.9. Bespoken or standard agreement
4. Other
4.1. How is compliance communicated with partners?
4.2. Are there criteria on partners as such?
4.3. Will you have more or less SLAs in the future?
4.4. Which are the biggest challenges in terms of risk manage-
ment?
4.5. What opportunities do you see with new business models
and ways of working?
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Table 3: SLA survey results on internal and external SLA usage by 41 respondents.
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Financial services 250 1 200 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial services 400 900 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government 7000 60 000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Food 80 200
Food 55 80
Food 120 300
Food 150 278 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Food 180 500 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Food 220 2 000 Yes Yes
Food 75 240 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government 1200 3 400 Yes Yes Yes
Government 1600 2 500 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government 600 480 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government 800 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government 55 60 Yes Yes Yes
Food 150 1 500 Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Government 315 280 Yes Yes Yes Yes
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